Executive pharmaceutical background, R&D investment and corporate innovation performance (2025)

Keywords: Chinese pharmaceutical listed companies, executive pharmaceutical backgrounds, R&D investment, government subsidies, corporate innovation performance

Executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and R&D investment

The upper echelons theory posits that company executives with technical backgrounds tend to invest more in innovation activities [13]. They also maintain an open mindset toward the failure of R&D, making them more willing to innovate and more likely to make proactive R&D investment decisions [14]. Managers with technical backgrounds not only possess specialized knowledge but also have a profound understanding of the importance of financial support for R&D activities. Therefore, when allocating resources, they are inclined to increase R&D investment intentionally. Furthermore, they have innovative thinking and an entrepreneurial spirit [15]. They not only bring professional knowledge and experience to corporate strategic decisions but also send motivating signals to technical personnel [16]. Because executives with technical backgrounds are both technical experts and important decision-makers in corporate strategic decisions, they provide professional guidance and recommendations for corporate innovation, influencing the company’s innovation investment. Research found that entrepreneurs’ technical education backgrounds motivate companies to engage in technological innovation activities [17]. In the pharmaceutical industry, which is a typical high-tech sector, the development of new products relies on corporate R&D investment. If the executives have relevant pharmaceutical expertise and a deep understanding of the development trends in the industry, they will prioritize technical innovation and product development. This not only increases R&D investment but also enhances the efficiency of R&D investment. So, this study proposes Hypothesis 1:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Executive pharmaceutical backgrounds are positively related to R&D investment in pharmaceutical companies.

R&D investment and corporate innovation performance

R&D investment is a concrete manifestation of a company’s innovation capability and has an impact on innovation performance. First, R&D investment can enhance a company’s innovation performance through the cumulative effects of knowledge, technology, capital, as well as economies of scale [18]. Second, R&D investment leads to the creation of new capital or capital upgrades, the introduction of new knowledge, and new technologies, directly promoting corporate innovation [19]. Third, frequent innovation activities and interactions among R&D personnel during training enable the effective use and integration of advanced knowledge from both internal and external sources, facilitating innovation. This, in turn, enhances the ability to absorb and transform innovations, leading to a significant improvement in innovation performance [20]. Finally, the integration of knowledge and technological resources from R&D of the production process generates economies of scale. This promotes production integration and standardization, enhances product market adaptability, and accelerates the realization of results and value creation [21]. Research showed that R&D investment has a significant positive impact on innovation performance [22]. Research by Bae & Han focusing on high-tech enterprises, discovered that enhancing the R&D investment contributes to improving innovation performance [23]. Therefore, when there is a higher level of R&D investment, companies can engage in more innovation activities, leading to an improvement in innovation performance. In other words, R&D investment has a significant positive effect on innovation performance. So, this study proposes Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): R&D investment has a significant positive impact on innovation performance in pharmaceutical companies.

The mediating effect of R&D investment

According to the resource-based theory, the quantity and structure of R&D are crucial factors influencing a company’s innovation performance [24,25]. Numerous studies have shown that increasing R&D investment can promote the innovation performance [26,27]. Executives, as the highest decision-makers in the business, directly influence the quantity and structure of R&D investment in the innovation decision-making process. In pharmaceutical companies, executives indirectly affect innovation performance through R&D investment in areas such as drug innovation, technological innovation, and process innovation. Executive pharmaceutical background has a significant positive impact on R&D investment because they have more specialized knowledge in pharmaceutical products and technology. They can leverage their expertise to address issues that the company encounters during its development. Furthermore, they have a deep understanding of the importance of financial support for R&D activities and maintain an open mindset, which makes them more inclined to make positive R&D investment decisions. Therefore, R&D investment has a significant positive impact on innovation performance, and executive pharmaceutical background has a significantly positive impact on R&D investment. R&D investment serves as an intermediate variable between executive pharmaceutical background and innovation performance, playing a “bridging” role. So, this study proposes Hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): R&D investment mediates the relationship between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and innovation performance in pharmaceutical companies.

The moderating effect of government subsidies

Government subsidies refer to a series of policy measures taken by the government, such as tax incentives, tax reductions, and financial subsidies, that provide direct or indirect cash flow support to businesses, thereby reducing the cost of innovation activities, alleviating corporate financing pressure, and encouraging engagement in innovative research and development [28]. Although executive in pharmaceutical companies may formulate strategic decisions to increase R&D investment based on technological and market conditions, external environmental uncertainties can still be obstacles that hinder the company’s willingness and capability to innovate [10,29]. Government subsidies, as a significant source of external resources for companies, can effectively mitigate the adverse impact of environmental uncertainties on businesses [30]. First, government subsidies help companies alleviate cash flow shortages caused by uncertain environments, providing liquidity support [31]. Second, government subsidies play a signaling role in uncertain environments [11]. On the one hand, government subsidies demonstrates the government’s recognition of the subsidized projects and companies, which to some extent alleviates management’s concerns about R&D uncertainty, boosts their confidence, and fosters innovation enthusiasm [32]. On the other hand, government subsidies send favorable signals to the external market, aiding companies in attracting external financing [33]. Additionally, companies that receive government subsidies are subject to supervision by government agencies, ensuring the effective execution of R&D investments [34]. So, this study proposes Hypothesis 4:

H4: Government subsidies moderate the relationship between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and R&D investment.

Pharmaceutical companies that receive government subsidies enhance an executive’s confidence, and reduce their psychological uncertainties. Government subsidies have a positive impact on R&D investments in terms of external financial support and psychological efficacy. This, in turn, enhances corporate innovation performance. Conversely, when pharmaceutical companies that cannot get government subsidies, following a precautionary principle, this reduces the intensity of R&D investment, lowering R&D performance. Therefore, following the above hypothesis, this study further presents a moderated mediation model and proposes Hypothesis 5:

H5: Government subsidies moderate the mediating effect of executive pharmaceutical background on corporate innovation performance through R&D investment.

The theoretical model for this study is illustrated in Figure 1.

Sample selection and data sources

This study uses listed Chinese pharmaceutical companies from 2015 to 2022 as the research sample. The selected sample was processed as follows: companies with significant issues and risks of ST or *ST were excluded, companies with missing data were excluded, and companies for which executive background data could not be obtained were excluded. After these exclusions, the study obtained data for 223 pharmaceutical listed companies over 8 years. Based on Wind and CSMAR databases, executive resume information was manually collected and organized for all pharmaceutical listed companies from 2015 to 2022 to determine whether the chairman and CEO had a pharmaceutical background. Data on R&D investment and corporate innovation performance mainly came from the CSMAR database. To eliminate the influence of extreme values, this study conducted Winsorization for each variable at the 1% and 99%.

Variable definitions

(1) Dependent Variable: Corporate Innovation Performance (CIP): Following the research [35], corporate innovation performance is represented by the number of patent applications in the current year, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications plus one.

(2) Independent Variable: Executive Pharmaceutical Background (EPB): In this study, executive pharmaceutical backgrounds are considered to exist if the chairman or CEO of a pharmaceutical company has experience in research or development of new drugs, has studied pharmaceutical-related disciplines, or holds professional titles in the pharmaceutical field such as practicing pharmacist while in office.

(3) Mediating Variable: Research and Development Investment (R&D): This refers to the total expenditure on research and development by the company and is obtained from the annual report data of listed companies, transformed into natural logarithms.

(4) Moderating Variable: Government Subsidies (SUB): This refers to the total amount of government subsidies recorded in the company’s income statement, obtained from the annual report data of listed companies, transformed into natural logarithms.

(5) Control Variables: Following the practices of other scholars, this study selects the following variables as control variables: firm value (Tobin-q), current ratio (CR), leverage ratio (Lev), firm size (Size), shareholding ratio of major shareholders (Big 1), executive dual roles (Dual), and the proportion of independent directors (Indp). The definitions of each variable are shown in Table 1.

Model construction

This study constructs Model 1 to test the impact of executive pharmaceutical background on R&D investment (Equation 1):

This study constructs Model 2 to test the impact of R&D investment on corporate innovation performance (Equation 2):

This paper constructs Model 3 to examine the moderating effect of government subsidies on the relationship between executive pharmaceutical background and R&D investment (Equation 3):

Where Controls represent the set of control variables, and ε is the error term. Model (1) tests H1, and Model (2) tests H2. To test the mediating effect of Hypothesis 3, this study uses three-stage regression analysis. Considering that some scholars raised questions about it, this study simultaneously uses the Bootstrap analysis method in the SPSS PROCESS to test the mediating effect and the moderated mediating effect [36], and repeats the simulation 2000 times to calculate confidence intervals [37].

Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics results for the variables. It can be seen that the mean value of corporate innovation performance (CIP) in the pharmaceutical industry is 4.478, with a standard deviation of 6.901. This indicates that the innovation performance level of Chinese pharmaceutical companies is relatively low and there is a certain degree of difference. The mean value of executive pharmaceutical backgrounds (EPB) in pharmaceutical companies is 0.499, suggesting that about half of the executive team members in Chinese A-share pharmaceutical listed companies do not have pharmaceutical backgrounds. The mean value of R&D investment (R&D) is 18.259, indicating that pharmaceutical companies invest significantly in innovation.

Correlation analysis

Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations for the main research variables. From the results of the correlation analysis, the coefficients between EPB and R&D, EPB and CIP, R&D and CIP, SUB and R&D, SUB and CIP are all positive and significant. This indicates that executive pharmaceutical backgrounds are significantly positively correlated with corporate innovation performance, significantly positively correlated with R&D investment, and R&D investment is significantly positively correlated with corporate innovation performance. The results of the correlation analysis are generally consistent with the hypotheses and justify further multiple regression analysis.

Regression analysis and hypothesis testing

This study first uses three-stage regression analysis to test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, as results shown in Table 4. In Model 2, it is demonstrated that executive pharmaceutical backgrounds positive significantly influence R&D investment (β=0.236, P<0.001), confirming H1. Model 5 showed that R&D investment positively affects corporate innovation performance (β=0.412, P<0.001), confirming H2. Model 6 indicated that executive pharmaceutical backgrounds (β=0.214, P<0.001) and R&D investment (β=0.319, P<0.001) positively influence corporate innovation performance. This confirms the mediating role of R&D investment in the relationship between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and innovation performance, thus validating H3. The study further employs the Bootstrap method to verify whether the indirect effect is significant. The results show that executive pharmaceutical background has a positive indirect effect on corporate innovation performance through R&D investment (Indirect Effect =0.0947, Bootstrap 95% CI=[0.0102, 0.1018]), with the confidence interval not containing zero, indicating that the indirect effect reaches a significant level and further supporting H3.

To examine whether government subsidies moderate the relationship between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and R&D investment, the study constructs an interaction term EPB*SUB and tests the significance of its coefficient. Model 3 shows that the interaction term EPB*SUB has a significantly positive regression coefficient on R&D investment (β=0.159, P<0.001), validating H4. Simultaneously, the study visualizes the interaction effect, demonstrating the direction and trend of the moderating variable of government subsidies. Under high government subsidies, the regression slope of executive pharmaceutical backgrounds on R&D investment is relatively steep. Under low government subsidies, the slope is relatively gentle. Therefore, Figure 2 further illustrates that government subsidies moderate the relationship between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and R&D investment, confirming H4 visually.

When further examining the moderated mediation effect, the study employs the Bootstrap method. It creates 2, high and low groups of the moderating variable by adding and subtracting one standard deviation from the mean. The study obtains the conditional indirect effect values for different conditions, as shown in Table 5. It is observed that when SUB is one standard deviation below the mean, the conditional indirect effect of executive pharmaceutical backgrounds on corporate innovation performance through R&D investment is 0.0543, with a Bootstrap 95% confidence interval not containing zero. When SUB is at the mean, the conditional indirect effect is 0.0978, with the Bootstrap 95% confidence interval not containing zero. When SUB is one standard deviation above the mean, the conditional indirect effect is 0.1267, with the Bootstrap 95% confidence interval not containing zero. Simultaneously, the Index of Moderated Mediation is 0.0786, with a Bootstrap 95% confidence interval not containing zero. Therefore, government subsidies moderate the mediating effect of executive pharmaceutical backgrounds on corporate innovation performance through R&D investment, confirming H5.

Conclusion

In the current context of China’s strong emphasis on innovation-driven, the competitive advantage of pharmaceutical companies increasingly depends on their level of innovation. As the highest decision-maker in companies, the executive directly influences corporate R&D investment and innovation performance. Additionally, government subsidies, as significant external factors in alleviating corporate financing constraints, also impact a company’s R&D investment. This study used data from Chinese pharmaceutical companies listed on the stock market from 2015 to 2022 to explore the relationships among executive pharmaceutical backgrounds, government subsidies, R&D investment, and corporate innovation performance. The findings reveal that executive pharmaceutical backgrounds have a significant positive impact on corporate R&D investment. R&D investment contributes to enhancing the innovation performance of pharmaceutical companies and plays an intermediary role between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and corporate innovation performance. Government subsidies act as a moderator in the relationship between executive pharmaceutical background and R&D investment, and they also moderate the mediating effect of executive pharmaceutical background, R&D investment, and corporate innovation performance [38-40]. This study not only expands the theories in the areas of characteristics of TMT, R&D investment, and corporate innovation performance but also provides valuable policy implications for the appointment and selection of executives in pharmaceutical companies.

Managerial implications

(1) Appointment of Executives with Pharmaceutical Backgrounds. Executive pharmaceutical backgrounds have a positive impact on R&D investment in pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, when appointing executives, pharmaceutical companies need to consider whether candidates have a pharmaceutical background as an important reference criterion. As a typical high-tech enterprise, the pharmaceutical industry relies mainly on the development of new products for its growth. If the management team has relevant pharmaceutical professional backgrounds, a deep understanding of the development trends in the industry, and specialized knowledge, it will be more inclined to promote R&D activity. This will not only increase R&D investment but also improve the efficiency of R&D investment. Specific measures include: First, incorporating executive pharmaceutical backgrounds into executive appointment charters and documents, and prioritizing the appointment of executives with professional technical backgrounds, as such backgrounds are more likely to encourage active engagement in the company’s R&D activity, thereby increasing R&D investment. Second, establishing an efficient executive incentive mechanism. This will implement financial incentives, equity incentives, and other measures for executives to motivate them in their work and prevent short-sighted behavior. Finally, from an objective and fair perspective, companies should establish a reasonable executive performance evaluation system [41]. Given the clear characteristics of high technology, high investment, high risk, and high return in pharmaceutical R&D activities, it is necessary to ensure the accuracy and scientific soundness of executive performance assessments so that executives are less likely to consider leaving their positions.

(2) Enhancing R&D Investment in Pharmaceutical Companies. From the perspective of the feedback effect of the corporate innovation system, R&D investment has a significant impact on improving corporate innovation performance. Therefore, pharmaceutical companies should increase their investment in R&D activities, provide sufficient funds, materials, and other supports for corporate innovation activities, and formulate a detailed policy measures to ensure that funds are reasonably allocated to R&D activities. In addition, companies should ensure the sustainability of R&D investment, allocate R&D funds reasonably, and invest funds in R&D in stages and batches to ensure that companies have the motivation for continuous innovation [42]. Furthermore, from the perspective of the reverse feedback effect of the corporate innovation system, the higher the R&D investment of a company, the easier it is to obtain government subsidies, which further provides sufficient funds for corporate R&D, thereby giving companies the vitality to innovate continuously.

(3) The government can fully leverage the functions of government subsidies by providing fund resources and sending signals to stimulate corporate innovation, guiding external funds towards businesses, thereby encouraging more societal funding to support innovation. Simultaneously, the government must supervise these subsidized companies and ensure the transparency in the subsidy process. This measure aims to effectively regulate the behavior of all parties to ensure the effectiveness of government subsidies. The government should also require companies to enhance their internal governance to prevent negative impacts on subsidies resulting from short-sightedness and agency behavior by corporate management.

Research limitations and prospects

This study has several limitations: First, R&D investment plays a mediating role between executive pharmaceutical backgrounds and corporate innovation performance, but there are likely other mediating variables that need to be further analyzed in future research. Second, due to the difficulty of data acquisition, this study only examined the pharmaceutical backgrounds of chairpersons and CEOs, and the pharmaceutical backgrounds of the entire executive team should be further verified and analyzed in future research. Finally, this study used pharmaceutical listed companies as the sample, and future research can select other industry-listed companies as research subjects to enhance the generalizability of the research conclusions.

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